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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Defendant of burglary and theft. When reviewing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, the appellate court 
applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, "which requires that 'if 
the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are 
3 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside.'" State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987))/ Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 
861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The appellate court will not 
disturb the findings unless they are clearly erroneous." 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 432 (citing Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 
60 (Utah 1987)). In addition, the appellate court gives due regard 
to the opportunity of the "trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made applicable to criminal 
cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(7)). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, and cases whose interpretation is determinative, are 
set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and 
arguments of the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Stephen P. Murphy and Grant Dion Barnes, as co-defendant, were 
initially charged by way of information filed on June 26, 1996, 
with burglary, failure to respond to officer's signal to stop, 
aggravated assault, theft, possession of burglary tools, and 
driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license. On June 26, 
1996, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel and pleaded 
4 
not guilty to burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and possession of burglary tools, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205. On 
October 3, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel 
for bench trial. After trial, the court convicted Defendant of 
burglary and theft and acquitted Defendant of possession of 
burglary tools. At the same time, the trial court sentenced 
Defendant to two indeterminate terms of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison for burglary and theft, in addition to two $5,000 
fines and restitution as determined by the parole board. On 
December 4, 1996, the trial court signed its Judgment, which was 
entered on December 12, 1996. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on 
January 10, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In June 1996, Stephen P. Murphy had been a contract 
laborer for Mesa Moving & Storage Company located in North Salt 
Lake for approximately three or four years (Bench Trial Transcript, 
R. 93, lines 2-5) . * As a contract laborer, Mr. Murphy loaded and 
unloaded moving trucks (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 6-7); 
2. Mr. Murphy would find out when and where he was to work 
by calling dispatch at the Mesa Moving & Storage Company and 
XA1 though Mr. Murphy had been working for Mesa Moving & Storage 
Company for approximately three to four years, he had been working in 
the moving business for approximately eleven years (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14). 
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speaking with Mr. Robert Albertoni, who would then make the 
necessary arrangements for work (Bench Trial Transcript, 93, 
lines 8-11) / 
3. On Tuesday, June 22, 1996, : -^s visiting 
Defendant, with whom Mr. Murphy had been friends for approximately 
eleven years (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94).2 While visiting with 
Defendant, Mr. Murphy had car problems and needed money for parts 
to his car prior to returning to Provo (Bench Trial Transcript, R, 
94, lines 7-11); 
4. As a result, Mr. Murphy, later that night, decided to go 
to Mesa Moving & Storage Company to leave a note for Mr. Albertoni 
to inform him of his whereabouts so that work could be arranged the 
next day (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94i. Defendant accompanied 
Mr MIII pi ly (Bench Trial Transcript, mes 22-2. 
lines 11-12) ; 
.. 5. After a r r :i v:i i ig at Me s a Mo^ 'i i Ig & S t:o i: age Compai I;: ; 1 1 :i : 
Murphy attempted to get the attention of an employee who was 
inside the building to give him a note for Mr. Albertoni (Bench 
Trial Transcript, 3-6); 
6. In the course of attempting to get the employee's 
attentioi i, 1: In : I ii n: pi i;y sai ; a v ending machine and cl lange machine 
located on a forty-eight foot flat-bed trailer outside the bay 
Murphy "had just found out that [Defendant] had been out of 
. . ." (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93-94). 
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doors on the loading dock (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 95, lines 7-
14/ R. 96, lines 16-20); 
7. Mr. Murphy, himself, then picked up the vending together 
with the coin changer, which was located on top of the vending 
machine (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96), and loaded the units into 
the back of his car, which was a hatchback (Bench Trial Transcript, 
R. 97; R. 11-12); 
8. As Mr. Murphy began to leave, the employee, who had been 
working inside the building, came out of the building and saw Mr. 
Murphy's car leaving at a high rate of speed (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 97, 61; R. 75-76); 
9. Mr. Murphy ran a stop sign (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
97, lines 11-12). A police officer for the city of North Salt 
Lake, Craig Beckstrand, attempted to stop Mr. Murphy after seeing 
Mr. Murphy run the stop sign (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 64-65); 
10. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Murphy attempted to explain why 
he was not stopping (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 20-23) . 
Defendant, a parolee, wanted out of the car and stated "Let me out 
of here, this isn't where I need to be right now" (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25; R. 109, lines 23-24); 
11. Officer Beckstrand chased Mr. Murphy onto the freeway 
towards Salt Lake City (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 65-67). Mr. 
Murphy refused to stop his vehicle until confronted some time later 
by Salt Lake City Police Officers in Salt Lake City proper (Bench 
Trial Transcript, R. 69-70); 
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12. Throughout the chase, Defendant complained to Mr. Murphy 
about not stopping and tried to exit the vehicle, all the while 
urging Mr. Murphy to stop (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98-99); 
13. Shortly before Defendant came to a complete stop, 
Defendant jumped out of the vehicle and was apprehended by the 
police (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98, lines 2-14); 
14. After the stop and subsequent arrest of Mr. Murphy and 
Defendant, the police retrieved a screwdriver and crowbar from the 
back seat of the Mr. Muryphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 70, 
lines 7-12); 
15. Out of the back of Mr. Murphy's car, Officer Beckstrand, 
without assistance,3 retrieved a vending machine and coin changer, 
which was attached to the vending machine by a steel cable (Bench 
Trial Transcript, R. 70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14); 
16. Stephen P. Murphy and Grant Dion Barnes, as co-defendant, 
were initially charged, as parties, by way of information filed on 
June 26, 1996, with burglary, failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop, aggravated assault, theft, possession of burglary 
tools, and driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license 
(Information, R. 8-11) ; 
17. On June 26, 1996, Defendant appeared for arraignment with 
appointed trial counsel and pleaded not guilty to burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, theft, a 
3At trial, Officer Beckstrand testified that the vending machine 
and coin changing machine weighted approximately "30 to 50 pounds 
total" (R. 72, lines 2-6). 
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third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and 
possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (Minute Entry - Notice, R. 13-14); 
18. On October 3, 1997, Defendant appeared with his co-
defendant, Stephen P. Murphy, for trial (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
49). Prior to trial, however, Mr. Murphy pleaded guilty to the 
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop and theft, with 
the remaining counts being dismissed (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
50-59); 
19. At trial, Mr. Murphy testified that Defendant did not 
assist in the theft of the vending machine and coin changing 
machine (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 8-10) . 
Mr. Murphy further testified that Defendant knew nothing of the 
theft (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94-95) until Mr. Murphy explained 
it to him in the course of the chase from North Salt Lake to Salt 
Lake City proper (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-
25); 
20. In the course of investigating the alleged burglary, 
Officer Arnold was informed by the other officers at the scene that 
"they found that the side door [of Mesa Moving & Storage Company] 
had been pried and that the lock was broken on it" (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 81, lines 4-6); 
21. Officer Arnold testified at trial that, while there were 
photographs of the side door, he did not have any photographs of 
9 
the alleged pry marks because lf[t]hey didn't turn out very well. 
They were over-exposed" (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 7-13)/ 
22. Officer Arnold further testified to the following 
concerning the pry marks: 
MR. COLE: Now, have you had experience in the 
past with looking at pry marks? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: Yes, I have. 
MR. COLE: Based on that experience, did you 
try to match [the pry marks] with State's 
Exhibit No. 10 which was found in the vehicle 
driven by Defendant Murphy and in which Mr. 
Barnes was passenger? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: In just looking, it looks like 
that it has been pried against a painted 
surface, which that is a painted surface. 
MR. COLD: Okay. Was it possible to do more 
scientific tests on that? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: No. 
• * * * 
MR. COLE: I'd like to call your attention to 
the end of the pry bar at that time. Would you 
tell me what you see on the end of that 
photograph? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: It looks like some paint or 
some white at the —at the very end of it. 
MR. COLE: Did you have an opportunity to 
compare that with the paint at the scene? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: It appears to be the same 
color paint. 
MR. COLE: Did you check for fingerprints? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: I did. 
MR. COLE: What did you find? 
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OFFICER ARNOLD: I wasn't able to come up with 
any fingerprints. 
MR. COLE: And what exactly did you test? 
OFFICER ARNOLD: The door — the inside of the 
door and the outside of the door and the frame 
area. 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 81-83); 
23. On cross-examination, Officer Arnold testified that he 
did not check either the candy vending machine or coin changer for 
fingerprints (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 17-21); 
24. At trial, the owner of the vending machine and coin 
changer testified that the vending machine and coin changer, with 
product and money, would weigh approximately "between 50 and 70 
pounds, I would think roughly . . . [p]robably about 80 pounds" 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 88, lines 18-25); 
25. The owner also testified that, while being very awkward 
and difficult, it is possible to move the "units" by yourself 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 89, lines 6-12);4 
26. Shortly after closing arguments that same day, the trial 
court convicted Defendant of burglary and theft and acquitted 
Defendant of the charge of possession of burglary tools (Bench 
Trial Transcript, R. 132/ Minute Entry, R. 27-28/ Judgment, R. 30-
31); 
4The owner testified that the vending machine sits on top of a 
table, is about two and one-half feet tall, and is approximately two 
and one-half to three feet wide (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 90-91) . 
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27. The trial court signed the Judgment on December 4, 1996, 
which was entered on December 12, 1996 (Judgment, R. 30-31); 
28. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on January 10, 1997 (R. 
32-34) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the 
conviction of defendant for burglary and theft inasmuch as the 
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence presented at 
trial. The evidence at trial establishes that the State failed to 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is required to 
do. A review of the evidence supporting the burglary and theft 
convictions leads one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's 
convictions are based on conjecture or supposition, which does not 
amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary 
and theft, as set forth above pursuant to the marshaling 
requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial 
court's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's 
conviction of burglary and theft inasmuch as it leads to a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court. 
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore appropriate 
in the instant case. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT 
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INASMUCH AS THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a 
bench trial, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" 
standard, "which requires that fif the findings (or the trial 
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the 
findings (or verdict) will be set aside.f" State v. Featherson, 
781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987)); Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2 437 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). The appellate court will not disturb the 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous." Featherson, 781 P.2d 
at 432 (citing Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987)). In 
addition, the appellate court gives due regard to the opportunity 
of the "trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made applicable to criminal cases by virtue 
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(7)). 
As a matter of well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence 
alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused." 
State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986). Circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of *such quality and 
quantity as to justify a [a determination of] guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) 
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(quoting Nickles, 728 P.2d at 127) . When the evidence consists 
solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence: 
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to 
determine (1) whether there is any evidence 
that supports each and every element of the 
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence have a 
basis in logic and reasonable human experience 
sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty 
verdict is not legally valid if it is based 
solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt* 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
"Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient.'" State v Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). In the instant 
case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then persuade 
the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the State 
failed to prove that he was a was guilty of burglary and theft. 
See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or supposition; 
they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See 
Workman, 852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the State's argument that 
"speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable 
14 
doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards 
at its core"). 
As set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-2 02, "A person is guilty 
of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person," According to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404, "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 defines criminal 
liability as a party to a crime as follows: "Every person, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct." In other words, "[o]ne may be convicted 
as an accomplice if, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense, he or she ^solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense.'" State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202). 
The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the 
trial court's verdict that Defendant was a party to burglary and 
theft of the vending machine and coin charger: (1) On the night of 
June 22, 1996, Defendant accompanied Mr. Murphy to Mesa Moving & 
Storage Company to leave a note for Mr. Albertoni, the contact 
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person, to inform him of Mr. Murphy's whereabouts so that work 
could be arranged for Mr. Murphy the next day to get money for 
parts to Mr. Murphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 22-
23/ R. 94); (2) The testimony at trial that the vending machine and 
coin changer, which was connected to the vending machine by a steel 
cable, would be "awkward to carry by yourself" (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 72, lines 7-8; R. 73, lines 9-12; and R. 74, lines 
8-11; R. 89); (3) Defendant's statement to Mr. Murphy shortly after 
the chase began, "Let me out of here, this isn't where I need to be 
right now" (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25; R. 
109, lines 23-24); (4) Shortly before Defendant came to a complete 
stop, Defendant jumped out of the vehicle and was apprehended by 
the police (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98, lines 2-14); and (5) 
After the stop and subsequent arrest of Mr. Murphy and Defendant, 
the police retrieved a screwdriver and crowbar from the back seat 
of Mr. Murphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 70, lines 7-12). 
Even when the aforementioned evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support Defendant's convictions of burglary and 
theft. Notwithstanding the awkwardness, the uncontroverted 
testimony of Officer Beckstrand at trial was that the vending 
machine and coin changer could be lifted by oneself (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14) . In fact, the owner 
testified that, while being very awkward and difficult, it is 
possible to move the "units" by yourself (Bench Trial Transcript, 
16 
R. 89, lines 6-12). The inference that Mr. Murphy could and did 
lift the vending machine and coin changer by himself and put it in 
the back of his car is especially reasonable in light of the 
undisputed evidence that Mr. Murphy, at the time of trial, had 
worked loading and unloading moving trucks for approximately eleven 
years (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14). 
Further, there is no physical evidence, whatsoever, connecting 
Defendant, to the alleged burglary or theft. Officer Arnold, who 
investigated the burglary, testified at trial that he didn't get 
photographs of the alleged pry marks because lf[t]hey didn't turn 
out very well. They were over-exposed" (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
7-13). Later, when asked if he had matched the pry marks at the 
scene with the crowbar found in the backseat of Mr. Murphy's car, 
Officer Arnold evasively and nonresponsively testified that "[i]n 
just looking, it looks like that it has been pried against a 
painted surface, which that is a painted surface", and that it was 
not possible to do tests on that (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 81, 
lines 21-25/ see also R. 82-83, nonresponsive answer by Officer 
Arnold that "[i]t appears to be the same color paint" to the almost 
unbelievable question of whether he compared the paint in the 
picture of the pry bar with the paint at the scene). In addition, 
Officer Arnold testified that he found no fingerprints after 
checking both the inside and outside of the door frame as well as 
the door (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 7-14). In fact, 
Officer Arnold did not check either the vending machine or the coin 
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changer for fingerprints (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 17-
21) . 
The State presented no evidence, whatsoever, that Defendant, 
was a party to the burglary and theft, or that he acted with the 
same mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully 
in the building and solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining 
in the building with intent to commit theft. Rather, Mr. Murphy 
testified that Defendant incontrovertibly testified that Defendant 
did not assist in the theft of the vending machine and coin changer 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 8-10). Mr. Murphy 
further testified that Defendant knew nothing of the theft (Bench 
Trial Transcript, R. 94-95) until Mr. Murphy explained it to him in 
the course of the chase from North Salt Lake to Salt Lake City 
proper (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25) . 
As is established by the foregoing evidence at trial, the 
State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it 
is required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.5 A review of 
5Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
18 
the evidence supporting the burglary and theft convictions leads 
one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's convictions are 
based on conjecture or supposition, which does not amount to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary 
and theft, as set forth above pursuant to the marshaling 
requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial 
court's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's 
conviction of burglary and theft inasmuch as it leads to a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court. 
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore appropriate 
in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse his convictions of burglary and theft and remand for 
a new trial or further proceedings consistent with this Court's 
directions as stated in its opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with insufficiency of evidence 
for burglary and theft, which are matters of continuing public 
required. 
19 
interest and which, based on the facts of the instant appeal, 
involve issues requiring further development in the area of 
criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and public. 
Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2fctl) day of June, 1997. 
' }LD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
Attorneys rer Appellant 
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Addenda A: Judgment 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 4 51-4 300 
n t r- . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT?''^! 
fcc
^ 3 33 /iff -96 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GRANT DION BARNES, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ]( 
Case No. 961700488 
Hon. Glen R. Dawson, Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 3rd 
day of October, 1996, the defendant being present in person and 
represented by his attorney, Glen T. Cella, the State being 
represented by David M. Cole, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, Judge, 
presiding. 
The defendant having been convicted upon a finding of 
guilty of the offenses of Burglary, and Theft, both third degree 
felonies, and the Court having asked if the defendant had anything 
to say why judgment should not be pronounced; and no sufficient 
cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court; 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the 
offenses of Burglary and Theft, both third degree felonies, as 
charged and convicted. 
JU0QMENT ENTEHEO 
-v ^ 
„r» 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 
zero to five years on each count, and is fined $5,000 on each 
count, and ordered to pay restitution as determined by the parole 
board, as provided by law. Parties notified of judgment in open 
court. 
Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court 
on the 3rd day of October, 1996, the defendant has been transported 
to the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this c day of t k o - W - , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
^dl^fctV 
JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment 
this <^*^ day of November, 1996, to Glen T. Cella, Attorney for 
Defendant. 
J~^ <<^r \-^r>v-> 
